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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






BRUNO RIBEIRO DE ALMEIDA, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
  Respondent 
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an 
Order of the United States Department of Justice  
Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(Agency No. A098-721-394) 
Immigration Judge: Alice S. Hartye 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 23, 2021 
 
Before: CHAGARES, HARDIMAN, and MATEY, Circuit Judges. 
 







* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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MATEY, Circuit Judge.  
Bruno Ribeiro1 De Almeida reentered the United States after removal. Hoping to 
remain, he met with an asylum officer who found he had no reasonable grounds to fear 
return to Brazil, a determination affirmed by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). Seeing no error 
in that determination, we will deny Ribeiro De Almeida’s petition for review. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Ribeiro De Almeida is a native and citizen of Brazil. After previously being 
removed from the United States, he illegally reentered in 2019. Soon detected, and hoping 
to avoid another removal, he met with an asylum officer. See 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 241.8(e), 208.31(c). There, he described his fears about returning to Brazil, citing his 
“anti-gang” opinions and support of his intersex stepson. He explained that his stepson was 
bullied in Brazil by another child whose father, Francis Da Silva, is a drug trafficker. 
Ribeiro De Almeida threatened to call the police about Da Silva’s child, prompting Da 
Silva to threaten Ribeiro De Almeida and his family. Two gunshots were later fired at 
Ribeiro De Almeida’s house, which Ribeiro De Almeida attributes to Da Silva.  
The asylum officer concluded that Ribeiro De Almeida did not establish a 
reasonable fear of persecution because of a protected ground or a reasonable fear of torture. 
An IJ agreed and also found no reasonable possibility of future torture, because Ribeiro De 
Almeida did not show that the Brazilian government would tolerate attacks by Da Silva 
upon his return.  
 
 1 We amend the caption to correct the petitioner’s name, which was misspelled at 
the proceeding before the Immigration Judge.  
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Ribeiro De Almeida filed this petition for review,2 arguing: 1) that his procedural 
due process rights were violated by the Government’s failure to provide him a notice in 
Portuguese that his previous order of removal would be reinstated (“Reinstatement 
Notice”); and 2) the IJ’s negative reasonable fear finding was not supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. Finding no error, we will deny the petition. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Procedural Due Process 
We review a procedural due process claim de novo, where a petitioner must show: 
“(1) that he was prevented from reasonably presenting his case[,] and (2) that substantial 
prejudice resulted.” Serrano-Alberto v. Att’y Gen., 859 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(quoting Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007)) (alteration in original). 
Ribeiro De Almeida argues his procedural due process rights were violated because 
the Government sent his Reinstatement Notice in English, not Portuguese. But that 
produced no prejudice, because it did not have the potential to affect the outcome of his 
deportation proceedings. Serrano-Alberto, 859 F.3d at 213. Ribeiro De Almeida says that 
if the Reinstatement Notice had been in his native language, he would have moved to 
reopen his first order of removal. But nowhere does he explain whether that step would 
have been permitted, or likely to succeed. With no showing of prejudice, Ribeiro De 
Almeida’s procedural due process claim fails. 
 
 2 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). See Romero v. Att’y Gen., 972 
F.3d 334, 340 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Bonilla v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 87, 90 n.4 (3d Cir. 2018)). 
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B. Negative Reasonable Fear Determination 
 Ribeiro De Almeida also fails to show that he had a reasonable fear of persecution 
or torture.3 We review an IJ’s reasonable fear determination for substantial evidence, 
Romero v. Att’y Gen., 972 F.3d 334, 340 (3d Cir. 2020), meaning that the IJ’s findings 
must be “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record 
considered as a whole.” Id. (quoting Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 502 (3d Cir. 
2011)). That is the case here.  
 First, there is substantial evidence supporting the IJ’s finding that Da Silva’s threats 
were motivated by revenge, not Ribeiro De Almeida’s membership in a particular social 
group. When asked by the IJ why Da Silva targeted him, he acknowledged that it was 
because “[he] ha[d] spoken to the police about [Da Silva]” and “because of [Da Silva’s] 
son.” (App. at 18.) And  substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding of no reasonable 
possibility that Ribeiro De Almeida will face violence based on his political opinions. 
Indeed, Ribeiro De Almeida testified that he has never been politically active in Brazil.  
 Likewise, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that there was no reasonable 
possibility that Ribeiro De Almeida will face torture. Ribeiro De Almeida argues that there 
is a reasonable probability that public officials will acquiesce to his torture because the 
police were slow to respond to his report, leading to gunshots. But “[t]o establish 
 
 3 To prove a reasonable fear of persecution or torture, Ribeiro De Almeida had to 
show a “reasonable possibility that he [] would be persecuted on account of his [] race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, or a 




acquiescence, an applicant must demonstrate that, prior to the activity constituting torture, 
a public official was aware of it and thereafter breached the legal responsibility to intervene 
and prevent it.” Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 516 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 Ribeiro De Almeida testified that after he filed a police report, “the police started to 
do surveillance on [Da Silva’s] home.” (App. at 63.) Far from accepting torture, the record 
shows that the authorities acted, and Ribeiro De Almeida never followed up further. Cf. 
Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 502 F.3d 285, 293 (3d Cir. 2007) (remanding for 
determination of governmental “acquiescence” to torture where “the IJ failed to note that 
the police ignored five reports filed by [petitioner] concerning violence and threats by gang 
members”). For that reason, the IJ’s decision is not erroneous.  
III. CONCLUSION 
Ribeiro De Almeida fails to show a violation of his procedural due process rights, 
because there was no prejudice. And the IJ’s negative reasonable fear determination is 
supported by substantial evidence. For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
